A Theoretical Framework for Operational Risk Management and Opportunity Realisation by Adrian Sparrow
Disclaimer:  The views expressed are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the New Zealand Treasury.  The Treasury takes 
no responsibility for any errors or omissions in, or for the correctness of, the 
information contained in these working papers. 






A theoretical framework for 







Advanced probability models are used to evaluate risks and to justify decisions 
where reliable data is available, e.g. reinsurance, money markets and nuclear 
energy. Operational risk management – the trade-offs made to run an efficient 
and effective organisation – has much less, and lower quality, data.  
 
In the first part of the paper, observations are made about the factors shaping 
operational risk management: the increasing shift of influence from tangible to 
intangible variables; the intuitive manner in which most operational risk is 
managed; the dynamic nature of the trade-offs balancing risk and reward; and 
in particular, that the critical factor in managing risk and opportunity is often how 
each choice feels rather than how a rational choice should be made. 
 
An economic framework is then used to examine the optimal relationship 
between operational risk and reward.   Although operational risk management 
has many investment characteristics, players are bias towards minimising risks 
rather than maximising opportunities.  This is because of uncertainty over the 
variables, and better knowledge of costs than rewards. 
 
The conclusion is that an overt, systematic approach to managing operational 
risk will be more effective and efficient than allowing an informal, intuitive 
process to operate.  This requires that assumptions and the judgement process 
must be made explicit; that the value of intangibles should be appreciated; and 
that the knowledge gained by individuals in managing risk should be codified 
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SUMMARY 
This paper was written mainly for people who manage operational risks and 
opportunities.  It looks behind management techniques to see what concepts 
can be used to describe what happens, why it happens, and how these 
concepts can be used to improve the techniques that are in use.  The paper 
should also be of interest to people who are curious about the factors that 
shape the way decision-makers respond to the challenge of balancing risk and 
opportunity. 
 
The paper takes a broad, high-level view, using various perspectives to 
examine the trade-offs made between risk and opportunity to run an efficient 
and effective organisation.  Consequently there is no detailed investigation of 
specialist areas of risk management such as structural engineering, clinical risk 
management or risks relating to financial instruments. 
 
For the purposes of this paper, operational risk management is defined as the 
systematic assessment and management of the trade-offs made between risk 
and opportunity to run an efficient and effective organisation. 
 
Operational risks and opportunities managed implicitly and intuitively by 
individuals will not be managed as effectively or efficiently as those managed by 
an explicit and rational system.  In either case, the up-front investment costs of 
mitigating risks or realising opportunities are much better known than the 
potential costs associated with realised risks or missed opportunities.  (This is 
true of both tangible and intangible factors, although by definition, the 
intangibles are more difficult to measure.) 
 
As a consequence, there is a bias towards sub-optimal reduction in investment 
costs, and a value placed on wait-and-see options.   As the drivers of 
organisational behaviour in both private and public sectors move organisations 
towards increasingly abstract, difficult to measure intangibles such as 
convenience, there is a higher reliance on the judgement of operational 
decision-makers.  Many operational decisions must be subjective, yet they will 
be less fallible if they are made with the help of systematic and explicit 
assessment of risks, opportunities and investment costs. 
 
The interpretive information screens which decision-makers use are initially 
implicit.   If this allowed to continue, unconscious sifting of data will occur, and 
the knowledge assets to manage operational risk will be built up covertly, 
making it difficult for the host organisation to retain or access the knowledge.  It 
will also be difficult to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the assets 
through codification and abstraction. 
 
Techniques and methodologies to manage operational risks and opportunities 
are filters.  They are designed to economise on the processing and 
consumption of data.  Given that astute data manipulation offers a lever to exert 
a magnified influence over physical factors, the trade-off between data and  3
physical inputs will shift in favour of data over time.  As data is collected and 
collated, the emphasis will shift in turn towards identifying patterns and trends, 
so that the use of data can also be reduced.  Using more data, less physical 
resources occurs as decision-makers move up the risk management learning 
curve.  In combination with insight jumps in productivity, the complexities of 
managing operational risk are reduced, which frees up capacity for new 
learning. 
 
As different parts of an organisation standardise “best practice” risk 
management approaches around the most valued features, there is a danger 
that the assessment process will ossify.  When the operational risk/opportunity 
context changes, this will render the ‘optimal’ risk management system sub-
optimal.  If this situation is allowed to continue, the system will fall into 
disrepute, causing individuals to revert to their own, unassisted judgement. 
Articulation of the knowledge gained in managing operational risk so that it can 
be captured in a formal risk management system offers the means to reduce 
contextual complexity.  This is preferable for most organisations rather than 
allowing enabling individuals to absorb complexity, managing operational risks 
and opportunities by implicit – and opaque – judgement. 
 
Whatever approach is adopted, individuals and organisations are faced with the 
same investment decisions when deciding what treatment is appropriate to 
reduce exposure to risk or to realise opportunities.   The value of the risk or 
opportunity must exceed the cost of treatment.  Investment will not occur in 
either risk mitigation or realisation of opportunity until the required margin above 
the resource cost and uncertainty value. In this respect, the value of a decision-
maker lies in how well he or she manages the trade-off between opportunity, 
treatment, and risk. 
 
Due to the conditional nature of decisions to invest in risk/opportunity treatment, 
there is often an incentive to retain the option to invest rather than to invest fully. 
The wait-and-see approach is rational on four counts: 
 
a)  at least part of a treatment investment is an irreversible sunk cost, 
b)  the opportunity cost of not pursuing other treatments is uncertain, but 
could overtake the investment treatment under consideration, 
c)  the probability of success is variable, and 
d)  treatment factors are invariably ‘lumpy’. 
 
Decision-makers do not operate in a vacuum.  Examining contextual drivers, 
and the marginal costs and benefits of investment decisions is helpful in 
understanding the behaviour of decision-makers in how they view operational 
risks and opportunities.  There is a bias towards: 
 
a)  under-investment in treatment, 
b)  minimisation treatment costs, and 
c)  reducing risk exposure. 
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Investment to realise opportunities suffers accordingly – which is compounded 
where there is an inherently low organisational appetite for risk.  Because of the 
difficulty measuring intangible factors, decision-makers tend to wait-and-see, 
and to err towards under-investment.  Consequently decision-makers will tend 
to fall short of the optimal points of investment in risk mitigation and, especially, 
in realising opportunities. 
 
A brief background goes through some of the factors leading to the current 
situation.  At the moment, those managing operational risks are doing so mainly 
on an intuitive rather than intellectual basis.  The key features of the current 
situation are described before going on to describe the particular objectives and 
scope of the paper. 
 
The main body of the paper examines the forces underlying operational risk 
management.  A simple framework is proposed to illustrate the dynamics of risk 
and opportunity.  Using this framework, various inferences are drawn which are 
then compared with observations made about risk management in public and 
private sector practice. 
 
The paper is summarised in a brief conclusion, which points out some 





PART I: INTRODUCTION 
A Brief History of Operational Risk Management 
Humans have been managing risk ever since they were capable of coherent 
thought – weighing up the risks of attacking large animals against the reward of 
tasty food; investing in the planting of crops for the reward of the harvest; 
sacrificing to the gods in expectation of reward in the afterlife.  Taking the 
opportunity out of risk and taking the risk out of opportunity is natural.  However, 
making that process explicit, systematic and logical – risk management – only 
really began with the coming of probability mathematics. 
 
Since then areas and industries lending themselves to quantitative analysis 
have devised increasingly sophisticated mathematics and methodologies to 
determine the likelihood, impact and exposure to risks.  Where data is available 
the results have been largely successful, but by definition the outcome of risk 
management is uncertain. Where relevant data is incomplete or unable to be 
collated into useful information, judgement is involved.  The decision-maker has 
to form an opinion about the situation and evaluate the costs and benefits of 
various action or inaction. 
 
Further uncertainty arises in the area of operational risk due to the value of 
economic intangibles such as goodwill, and the volatility of interrelationships 
amongst the factors determining each aspect of risk and opportunity.  Both the 
value of economic intangibles and volatility of interrelationships have been 
increasing rapidly over the last ten years. 
 
Given these features, risk management remains more of an art than a science, 
despite the growing body of literature classified as risk management. In terms of 
quantitative work, substantial progress has been made.  The basic principles of 
risk management are simple but lend themselves to elegant theories where 
data and process can be brought together in specialist niches. 
 
Similarly, there is a growing body of methodologies and case studies, which 
demonstrate how various risk management approaches can be used to bring 
structure to the management of operational risk. This is in response to the 
mounting appreciation of the value that systematic management of risk 
provides, even in areas where reliable quantitative data does not exist. 
 
Risk management has been recognised as a valuable discipline within various 
activities for some time, even if different terminology has been used.  These 
range from nuclear energy to policing initiatives.  A particularly strong tradition 
has developed in areas where there is sufficiently reliable data to use 
mathematics to produce useful quantitative analysis.  Momentum has been 
building in applying the same principles in operational risk management, where 
data is less reliable or is unavailable, and subjective judgement is used to 
provide more qualitative assessments. 
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While there has been steady progress in areas such as environmental care, 
various events around the world have accelerated the use of a systematic 
approach to the management of potential future events.  In the United States 
the loss of the Challenger space vehicle and collapse of thrifts had an impact; in 
New Zealand it was the collapse of the scenic Cave Creek viewing platform.  
While these events were sufficiently shocking at a national level to promote the 
advent of recognised operational risk management processes, at an 
organisation level localised shocks caused similar demands to put risk 
management systems in place.  This is particularly true of health and safety 
systems. 
 
With the rising awareness and recognition of operational risk management as 
such, various generic standards were published.  These have been successful 
in providing a reference against which individual organisations can compare 
their own methodologies.  The Australian/New Zealand Risk Management 
Standard is one example.  First published in 1995, it was revised in 1999 to 
incorporate some of the communication aspects highlighted in the Canadian 
standard.  This advancement has been reflected in ancillary aspects of risk 
management, for example in the management of governance risks through the 
Treadway Commission - Blue Ribbon Report process in the United States of 
America, King recommendations in South Africa, and Cadbury-Hampel process 
in the United Kingdom. 
 
A major feature of operational risk management as it is used by line managers 
in both private and public sector organisations (rather than vocational 
specialists) is the degree of judgement involved.  Usually the critical factor in 
being a good manager of risks for these decision-makers is not the rational 
reason for dong one thing rather than another but how each choice is felt.  In 
the absence of complete or reliable quantitative data, and under time pressure, 
they resort to using intuition to evaluate cause and effect.  This is done 
instinctively rather than intellectually, so that emotions indicate when an ex ante 
decision is right, wrong or in some grey zone of doubt. 
 
It is increasingly recognised that a systematic evaluation process will improve 
on that approach.  Methodologies based on the same principles outlined in the 
AS/NZS Risk Standard show in better perspective the risks and opportunities 
facing organisations. 
 
Key Features of Current Operational Risk Management Practice 
·  Complexity.  The rate of change in technology, relative competence and 
environment makes it too expensive and cumbersome to quantify all 
relevant variables to any great depth.  Operational risk management tends 
to use only simplistic mathematical modelling, since assigning more 
detailed values quickly becomes arbitrary and the results misleading 
through unsubstantiated pretensions of accuracy.  For example, a car 
manufacturer could compare precise monetary values on potential legal 
claims if it continues to install petrol tanks knowing that they are likely to  7
explode in an accident, against costs to retool production, yet discount a 
vague figure for loss of reputation, which could eventually be catastrophic. 
 
·  Judgement.  Due to incomplete and imprecise data, the screens that filter 
information into the knowledge used to make decisions inevitably skew 
interpretations to fit the organisational model.  An organisation that is 
driven by technocrats to making sound ecological decisions for the 
disposal of obsolete plant could be badly wrong-footed if it ignores an 
emotive campaign waged by ecological activists. For this reason, the filters 
need to be made explicit and recognised as such.  Organisational custom 
and practice, the ‘tone at the top’ and ethical norms will shape 
interpretation of the environment and potential events. 
 
Risks and opportunities are therefore subjective, making operational risk 
management inherently imprecise.  The situation is compounded because 
events are not often well documented.  Key players tend to move on, and 
managing the ramifications of an event takes precedence over analysing the 
causes  
 
·  Extrapolation is dangerous. Probabilistic uncertainty remains high when 
managing operational risks.  As Heraclitus noted, “Everything flows and 
nothing stays… you can’t step twice into the same river”.  Twenty-six 
centuries on, organisational rivers flow a little quicker than they did in his 
time.  Even in the public sector, organisational and environmental 
dynamics render past experience as no more than an indication of future 
interactions. 
 
·  Operational risk is idiosyncratic and situational.  A risk management 
system, which works well in one organisation, industry or sector, will not 
necessarily work well in another.  Analytical perspectives and filters will be 
different, as will data sources.  In addition the impact of externalities will 
have varying impacts on different organisations e.g. a change of 
government philosophy regarding import tariffs will impact Customs, 
importers and retailers in different ways and to different degrees. 
 
Where possible, managers of operational risk will use quantitative assessment, 
but the balance is by necessity skewed towards non-quantitative methods.  
Translating qualitative assessment into quantitative form allows clearer 
identification and setting of relative priorities in the treatment of risks and 
opportunities.  Giving judgements consistent values and making the judgements 
explicit makes the risk assessment process more transparent, and introduces 
some robustness into what can be an otherwise arcane process.  The danger is 
that the mathematical veneer can be mistaken for something more substantial, 
when in reality it is merely a crude conceptual tool with which to handle 
incompatible data. 
 
Assessing operational risk can be compared in some ways to the study of Black 
Holes.  Specific data is unavailable about the actual phenomenon itself, but an  8
indication of what goes on can be gleaned by the behaviour of variables on the 
periphery.  By using deductive reasoning to assess the risks and opportunities, 
decisions can be made about the most appropriate treatment to mitigate risk 
and realise opportunities which have a high probability of occurring.   It is more 
probable that adverse events will occur where there has been unsystematic 
assessment of the latent conditions leading to the event. 
 
However, it has to be acknowledged that the very uncertainty of the operational 
environment will occasionally cause adverse events to arise from extremely 
unlikely aberrations.  Risk assessment uses assumptions to gauge probabilities, 
not certainties. For this reason risk-averse managers will tend to mitigate the 
risk that procedures will fail to treat latent risk appropriately; in other words 
invest in ‘fail-safe’ systems that other managers consider redundant. 
 
Risk Appetite 
The appetite for risk can be determined in a less ad hoc fashion. Appetite for 
risk is the point of balance between risk and reward at which a decision-maker 
feels most comfortable.  Being consciously aware and explicit about that point is 
the necessary first step in the management of risk. In the absence of a simple 
model, it can be difficult for a decision-maker to describe or explain adequately 
why some risks are accepted and some opportunities are rejected.  Being 
specific, explicit and providing a reference point allows much greater order in 
the assessment of potential events.  It also provides for greater understanding 
of the action taken to mitigate risks and realise potential. 
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Observations About Management Behaviour 
In managing operational risks and opportunities, managers deal with tangible 
and intangible factors.  They manipulate these factors wittingly or unwittingly to 
trade risk against reward according to their own risk appetite.  Tangible factors 
are by definition easier to measure and are easily identified as costs. For 
example, the costs of data base processing are straightforward calculations, 
whether for potential reward (such as direct mail advertising) or to reduce risk 
(screening for patterns of fraud in credit card usage). 
 
Intangible factors are less easy to identify and reduce to a value that can be 
compared with tangible costs (e.g. staff morale and credibility with customers).  
Due to the lack of direct measures, any measures are used are tangible proxies 
to estimate the value of intangible factors (e.g. comparing sales of Coca-Cola 
against cola to derive brand value) – although the number of extraneous 
variables can make the results very debatable.  Such “Black Hole” calculations 
are unsatisfactory, but are increasingly necessary, given the shifting premium 
afforded to tangible factors. 
 
The astonishing value of .com shares is not entirely irrational, even if it is highly 
contentious.  It just reflects what has been happening in the area of ‘goodwill’ in 
apparently physical sectors.  BMW stresses its technological expertise and 
innovation as support for extracting value out of abstract, conceptual benefits 
such as prestige, membership of an exclusive club and ‘the driving experience’. 
For ‘luxury’ goods not necessary to sustain life, physical characteristics give 
way to abstract perceptions to achieve higher value. 
 
Those people managing operational risk usually have to do so without all the 
information they would like, with less time for consideration than they would 
prefer.  Tangible factors (mainly costs) are easier to grasp, require less defence 
in their presentation and can be considered with a good deal of certainty.  
Conversely, intangible factors are contentious and difficult to quantify.  Given 
that risks and rewards lie in the uncertain future, but costs begin in the present, 
there is an inherent bias for managers to stay within a least cost / wait-and-see 
‘operating zone’. 
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As a broad generalisation, managers of operational risk find themselves facing 
tangible and cost factors that are known, or can be calculated.  Potential gains 
are at best only highly probable.  Tangible gains can to some extent be 
calculated, but the gains in intangibles are not only uncertain but also 
ephemeral.  The rewards therefore need to be highly lucrative or easy to defend 
relative to costs before the appetite for risk will allow action to be taken on faith. 
 
For example, the direct costs of setting up a statistically significant audit of 
insurance fraud are known (computing power required).  Indirect costs are also 
known (hiring new staff to take over the duties of staff transferred to audit 
duties).  Intangible costs to some extent can be calculated (the drop in 
productivity attributable to staff unrest caused by a perception that clients are 
somehow being unfairly treated).  Tangible gains can be calculated (tighter 
focusing of investigations to yield better returns).  All of these things can be 
weighed up relatively easily.  However, one of the most useful long-term effects 
of an audit sample is accurate knowledge about offending patterns and the 
dissuasive impact on potential offenders.  As a result, unless the tangible 
benefits can be calculated to outweigh the known and calculated costs involved 
by a clear margin, the decision-maker has to have sufficient faith that the 
programme will yield sufficient intangible benefits to go ahead. 
 
While this might be acceptable to a brand manager comfortable dealing with 
images and perceptions, it is very unattractive to public sector agencies.  
Furthermore, many organisations have long institutional memories of 
unpleasant intangible costs associated with a course of action.  In these cases, 
faith in the opportunity on offer has to be almost evangelical before a manager 
will take the risk. 
 
Line managers are paid for their judgement in managing the shifting dynamics 
of tangible and intangible risks and rewards.  While they can be reasonably 
assumed to have a good understanding of the tangible factors influencing their 
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to cope with intangibles on an unsystematic basis.  In other words, there is a 
danger of not appreciating what one doesn’t know (i.e. intangibles).  To take 
advantage of opportunities and to anticipate exposure to risks, systematic 
reflection is increasingly recognised as necessary.  This is recognised by the 
more widespread practice of operational risk management.  Initially operational 
risk management is of necessity iterative, but it does provide a foundation for 










Using a common psychological model of learning gives another perspective to 
illustrate the same points, using as an example the appointment of a new 
personnel manager into a stevedoring company. 
 
In the absence of an explicit operational risk management process, the 
personnel manager is initially not conscious or aware of the risks to which she is 
exposed and the potential opportunities available.  She develops the knowledge 
to manage risks and opportunities as the learning cycle progresses.  As she 
becomes aware of the situation, she will become conscious of things that she 
knows little about, but which have an impact on achieving her tasks – such as 
the ‘pecking order’ amongst crane drivers, stevedores, packers and wharfside 
workers.  During the third phase, she will become aware of what she needs to 
know, and practise that knowledge consciously – protocols for addressing 
workers, when to involve union representatives, and so on.  Finally, once 
conversant, the knowledge is practised unconsciously and she will know 
“intuitively” the best way to get an agreement. 
 
This cycle of learning in relation to operational risk management is not often 
articulated.  This means that the process is longer than it needs to be, and 
individuals gain the knowledge rather than the host organisation.  Since the risk 
management knowledge is not articulated, it is not codified nor is it transparent.  
Consequently, when operational variables change, the assumptions and 
Known  Unknown 
Conscious 
Unconscious  12 




The forces driving things to happen in organisations are changing.  Listed below 
are some of the changes to the way that different facets take organisational 













Functional silos, hierarchy 
 
Structure  Fluid, cross-functional teams 
Direction 
 




Scale  Mass customisation 
Input unit costs 
 
Emphasis  Customer value outcomes 
Tangibles 
 
High value production factors  Intangibles  
Loyalty, seniority 
 
Rewarded human value  Skills, performance 
Centralised 
 
Technology  Distributed 
 
The changes reflect the imperative to focus resources to maximum effect; to 
gain higher value return on investments (which is measured more and more 
abstract terms such as convenience and status).  This means flexibility, 
responsiveness, anticipation and targeted specificity in delivery of goods and 
services. 
 
Given the difficulties of measuring currently unmeasurable values, decisions are 
taken on judgement and intuition.  Unfortunately, where metrics are introduced, 
their introduction and presence in itself can cause a distortion.  In the absence 
of a systematic assessment of the risks, opportunities, priorities and appropriate 
treatment, there is a danger that decisions will be taken with an increasingly 
poor appreciation of the organisational ramifications.  Many companies are 
plagued, for example, by marketing divisions that launch products for which 
their colleagues in operations are ill-informed and unprepared.  A promotion is 
launched, the telephones go mad – and customers wait twenty minutes to 
speak to frazzled customer service agents who know little about the new 
product. 
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As a result, operational risk management methods and techniques have been 
introduced as tools to help guide those who take decisions at any level of an 
organisation.  This ranges from a salesman in a car yard “knowing” when to let 
a prospective customer test drive a $100,000 car, to fire fighters knowing which 
intervention to choose when a toddler’s life is at stake. 
 
The rest of the paper uses a simple framework to look at some aspects of the 
forces underpinning these methods and techniques. 
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PART II: THE KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
The first part of the framework follows Max Boisot’s model of the production 
function1 in which he describes how knowledge minimises an organisation’s 
consumption of energy, space and time for a given amount of effort. 
 
Key Factors 
The key factors in the knowledge production function are defined as follows: 
 
¨  Data is a property of things. 
A distinction between physical states, which may or may not convey 
information to an agent, depends on the agent’s knowledge capacity to distil 
the data into information. 
 
¨  Information is selected and re-arranged data. 
Information effectively establishes a relationship between things and agents; 
it is that part of the data residing in things that sets an agent in motion, 
having been filtered by the agent’s perceptual or conceptual apparatus. 
 
¨  Knowledge builds on information that is taken out of data. 
Knowledge is a property of agents inclining them to act in particular 
circumstances.   Knowledge cannot be directly observed, but it can be 
viewed as a set of probability distributions held by an agent, which orient the 
agent’s subsequent actions. 
 
When a knowledgeable person does not explicitly articulate his knowledge, his 
actions seem to be intuitive – by instinct or ‘sixth sense’.  Many successful 
entrepreneurs have learnt how to take data, rearrange it, and use their 
appreciation of the context to make profitable deals.  The same can happen 
with teams. 
 
Failing to make knowledge explicit means that it can be lost when the individual 
(or group) is no longer available in person.  No-one is now sure how the 
pyramids were built with such precision, for example.  The knowledge can also 
become redundant or become inflexible ‘received wisdom’.  Unlike intuition the 
knowledge may be explicit, but it becomes irrelevant because the data-









                                            







Model of Knowledge Use and Formation 
The knowledge to manage operational risks is often held by agents and 
organisations insensibly. The interpretative information screens used to sift 
operational data are therefore shaped unconsciously, as new information 
arrives to either consolidate or modify implicit probability distributions.  Risk 
management knowledge builds up over time to guide the reduction of exposure 
and realisation of opportunities, while simultaneously economising on the 
consumption of physical resources. 
 
As an example, a soldier on peacekeeping duties see an explosion (an event) 
and provides details (data) to an Intelligence Officer, who uses specific and 
general techniques (perceptual and conceptual filters) to provide a situation 
assessment (information) to the Commanding Officer (Agent), who then decides 
what risks and opportunities are latent, and what action should be taken. 
 
Given that codification and abstraction reduces the costs of converting 
potentially useable knowledge into knowledge assets, then allowing operational 
risk management to work in a covert, intuitive fashion is inefficient. If the 
existence and nature of knowledge can only be inferred from the action of 
agents, then knowledge assets have to be understood in a roundabout way.  In 
short, making operational risk management explicit is an important step towards 
better effectiveness and efficiency in running an organisation.  This applies not 
only to the techniques and methodologies applied to operational risk 
management, but also to the theory underpinning them. 
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Evolutionary Production Function 
Using capital and labour as traditional factors of production, curves aa’ and bb’ 
indicate the different mixes of treatment which can be applied to reduce 
exposure to risk (or alternatively, realise opportunity).  Moving along either of 
the given curves gives the rate at which one 
factor can be substituted for another. 
 
Applied to operational risk management, 
technical progress acts to reduce the 
quantity of capital and/or labour to achieve a 
given level of risk exposure (or realise a 
given level of opportunity).  This shifts the 
curve towards the origin, from aa’ to bb’ – 
an exogenously given discontinuity. 
 
However, following 
Boisot, it can be 
assumed that factors 
of production such as labour and capital can be 
decomposed into entities possessing both physical and 
information attributes.  Information attributes have the 
capacity to modify the behaviour of physical attributes, 
and hence decrease their rate of consumption for a 
given benefit.    
 
These information attributes and the knowledge 
capacity to manipulate them are becoming increasingly 
valuable2.  Boisot goes on to separately abstract 
physical and information attributes from the factors of a 
conventional production function to describe an evolutionary production 
function.  Using this model, data about operational risks and opportunities 
provides the raw material for information, so that the judgement decision-
makers possess (knowledge assets) can be modified appropriately.  The 
knowledge assets dispose the decision-makers to act in a particular way.  Risk 
management methodologies and techniques help shape the knowledge assets 
possessed by individuals, and to build up the knowledge assets of the 
organisation.  The methodologies and techniques act as information filters, 
which economise on the consumption and processing of data. 
 
Irrespective of an organisational risk management system being in place, the 
judgement of decision-makers emerges as a valuable knowledge asset for 
which the individual is rewarded.  However, without an explicit system of 
capturing the knowledge, those assets are seldom recognised as such and 
                                            























even less frequently captured systematically into the host organisation’s 
institutional memory. 
 
Boisot’s evolutionary production function offers two insights into the 
management of operational risk. 
 
Trade-Offs 
The first is that there is a trade-off between consumption of data and 
consumption of physical resources, (shown in the above diagram by moving up 
the curve aa’).  Two simple examples are the use of Collators on major police 
investigations, and Account Managers in consultancies who enable more 
focused use of professionals to solve crime and sell services respectively. 
 
The second is that as organisations evolve, the trade-off between physical and 
information inputs is asymmetrical, having a tendency to shift towards 
increasing the processing and consumption of data.  A process of 
differentiation, integration, and creation of memory-models do this.  Where 
these remain implicit in the realm of operational risk management, the working 
of this evolutionary production function is less efficient than where the models 
are explicit. 
 
Even if it were entirely efficient, the management of operational risk would still 
require some element of physical resource.  Furthermore, decision-makers 
confront the need to economise on the consumption of data as well as physical 
resources.  Filtering information from the data, and discarding the remaining 
data (represented here by the discontinuous jump down from one curve to 
another closer to the origin) does this. 
 
Decision-makers, as managers of operational risk and opportunity intuitively 
look for the regularities that suggest patterns.  Once a pattern is discerned, the 
need to deal directly with the data is largely for verification only.  The focus 
consequently shifts from data to pattern – focus is much sharper when 
screening filters, information and knowledge are made explicit and subject 
robust examination. 
 
Differentiating between risk and opportunity priorities can be achieved by 
insights which reduce the amount of data and physical resources by jumping to 
a curve closer to the origin.  It 
can also be done by substituting 
data for physical resources i.e. 
an upward and leftward shift on 
the aa’ transformation curve. 
 
Mirroring technical change in the 
more conventional production 
function, the data-economising 








discontinuities (as is the knowledge to which it gives rise).  The potential for 
endogenous discontinuity is therefore an inherent feature of operational risk 
management systems, whether the system is explicit or implicit.  It is obviously 
easier to realise that potential when the system is made explicit.  A given insight 
will reduce data handling, the weight on the system’s recall and the load on data 
exchange.  An insight however cannot be predicted from a prior knowledge of 
the data to be processed or the characteristics of the data processing agent.  
Paradoxically therefore, an operational risk management system that is working 
well tends to pursue a discontinuous, unpredictable course. 
 
Over the last five years operational risk management have provided sound 
models to guide the extraction of information from data in a methodical, codified 
fashion.  However, even leading methodologies such as AS/NZS 4360:1999 do 
not deal with abstraction in building up the knowledge assets that result. 
 
What is generally inferred in the methodologies is that there exists a direction to 
the technical change (unlike traditional production functions), in that over time 
the trade-off between factors will usually favour the use of data over physical 
resources.  The knowledge assets used to manage risks are generated as data 
accumulates, interpretative models are improved (moving productive activity 
upwards and to the left) and insights occur (dropping productive activity 
vertically downwards to another curve as better information is dug out of the 
data).  This assumes that the knowledge assets develop in such a way that they 
yield a net gain, given that the operational context is dynamic and so liable to 
make some aspect of the knowledge asset redundant as the relative value of 
risks, opportunities and treatment costs fluctuate. 
 
The starting point for the implicit, intuitive risk management process used by 
most operational decision-makers is accumulation of tacit, experiential 
knowledge.  This ability to absorb complexity is controlled by individuals within 
an organisation.  In the absence of a coherent process, such knowledge can 
only be articulated and communicated with difficulty.   
 
At the most basic level the absence of commonly understood terminology will 
lead to confusion.  Knowledge remaining in the heads of individuals makes its 
value to, and existence within, an organisation, precarious.   
 
For this reason, it is better for organisations to invest in the expression of 
knowledge and to reduce complexity, rather than to allow a risk management 
system to revert to the natural status quo (i.e. the absorption of complexity and 
the concomitant accumulation of tacit knowledge).  This can be seen in the way 
that mechanical diagnosis has been ‘built-in’ to modern cars, so that the value 
of remedial actions is retained and used not only to reduce exposure to 
breakdown risks, but also to realise latent design opportunities. 
 
Where operational risk is managed implicitly, the knowledge assets, which 
determine the management of operational risk, are not as appropriable as 
physical assets.  The more widely organisations rely on implicit knowledge  19 
assets to manage operational risk, the more difficult it is to capture and retain 
whatever value is created.  Even in the public sector this is a concern.  For the 
private sector this suggests that it will be difficult to defend the return from any 
competitive advantage brought from advanced operational risk management. 
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Learning and Insight 
To summarise, the knowledge assets emerging in risk management are the 
product of both moving up the learning curve, and of insight.  Insight is triggered 
by empirical data, and in return insight provides a base from which to improve 
the type of data collected.  Making explicit the development of operational risk 
management knowledge allows faster incorporation of useful data within the 
information structures created by insight; it also quickens the consequent 
shedding of excess data by enabling selective purges of redundant data.  This 
has the effect of reducing complexity, creating fresh capacity for further 
improvements and insights.  The types of models that can be built using this 
approach include credit scoring for bank loans. 
 
When operational risk management is left as an intuitive process, the rate of 
progress along the curve is limited to the capacity of individuals.  This is 
because the organisation does not systematically collect, collate or share 
individuals’ experience. When users are educated and acquire experience in a 
shared, transparent process then upward movement along the learning curve is 
hastened. 
 
Introducing systematic risk assessment is not without drawbacks.  A standard 
pattern of risk assessment and management will tend to emerge as 
performance improvements occur around those features that are most valued.  
Initially, the standardisation process moves in relatively large insight leaps 
downward from one experience curve to the next.  The insights also stimulate 
progress along each curve, which in turn leads to further insights.  Data 
complexity is reduced and factor savings result, but the closer the 
improvements come to the origin, the more constraining structures and 
standards become.  Hence, once established, risk management systems can 
ossify if it becomes accepted wisdom that optimal treatment has been 
determined. 
 
As previously discussed, the context in which knowledge assets develop is 
continually changing, so that a good operational risk management process must 
take care to steer between reducing complexity in the amount and nature of 
data that is processed, and absorbing complexity in the information screens that 
filter the data which feeds it. 
 
Logically, organisations should choose to invest in the means to articulate and 
capture knowledge so that it can be shared and used to facilitate good 
operational risk management. Investment in operational risk management 
however, is inherently skewed towards the alternative, which is to allow 
knowledge to remain tacit, and to enhance the ability of individuals to cope with 
higher levels of complexity.  This is examined in the next section. 
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PART III: INVESTMENT TO MINIMISE RISK AND REALISE OPPORTUNITY  
This part of the framework follows Dixit & Pindyck in their work on investment3 
and applies their reasoning to operational risk. 
 
Risk and Opportunity “Options” 
Dixit & Pindyck assert that the value of a risk must exceed the purchase and 
installation cost of the action necessary to treat it appropriately, i.e. by an 
amount equal to the value of keeping the investment option alive.  The 
opportunity cost of investing in the treatment can be large; and the opportunity 
cost is sensitive to uncertainty over the future value of the investment 
undertaken. 
 
It follows that there is an incentive to pay an exercise price for holding a risk or 
opportunity in abeyance rather than treating it, since exercising the treatment 
option is at least partially irreversible.  The option to invest is valuable in itself, 
because the potential realisation of an opportunity or a risk is uncertain.  If the 
value of the risk exposure or opportunity reward rises, the net value of 
investment in the treatment rises accordingly – and vice versa.  If the situation 
remains unclear, the organisation need not invest to the full extent and will 
suffer only the cost necessary to obtain deferral of the investment decision. 
 
The cost of postponement must be assessed against the costs imposed by a 
realised risk or missed opportunity.  Doing little or nothing is a valid choice, 
which is rational if considered assessment is made of the likelihood and impact 
of a potential event. 
 
In the absence of clear parameters and data to populate such a rational model, 
it could be argued that the value of a manager lies in the judgement to “know” 
when, and how much, to invest in the treatment of each risk and opportunity.   
This is particularly true in relation to real and anticipated changes in the relative 
values of treatment cost, opportunity and risk. 
 
“Most investment decisions share three important characteristics in 
varying degrees. 
 
1.  First, the investment is partially or completely irreversible.  In 
other words, the initial cost of the investment is at least partially 
sunk; you cannot recover it all should you change your mind. 
2.  Second, there is uncertainty over the future rewards from the 
investment.  The best you can do is assess the probabilities of the 
alternative outcomes that can mean greater profit (or loss) for 
your venture. 
3.  Third, you have some leeway over the timing of your investment.  
You can postpone action to get more information (but never, of 
course, complete certainty) about the future.”4 
                                            
3  Dixit & Pindyck (1994)  22 
 
Since the option value increases with the sunk cost of an investment and with 
the degree of uncertainty over future prices, the opportunity cost of the action 
chosen to treat a risk is a significant part of an investment decision. 
 
The nature and degree of uncertainty over future costs will have a significant 
effect on the treatment decision.  The higher the degree of uncertainty, the more 
valuable becomes the freedom not to invest if the treatment price goes up.  
Often, action such as organisational restructuring takes place in several phases 
but uncertainty pertains to the total cost of the investment.  Information will be 
revealed after the first few steps of the project are undertaken, so the pilot or 
proving stages have value above that suggested by traditional net present value 
calculations. 
 
Finally, the value of greater flexibility provided by a small scale investment 
might offset the economy of scale advantage enjoyed by a larger investment.  
This is a particularly appealing notion if it is accepted that those managing 
operational risks and opportunities have a low risk appetite and follow a wait-
and-see approach. 
 
In summary, operational risk management involves sunk costs; each decision 
must be made in an uncertain environment, and each choice allows some 
freedom of timing.  Consequently there will be a full commitment to mitigation of 
risk, or realisation of an opportunity until one of two conditions occurs.  The first 
is that the value of the marginal output of the investment is perceived to be 
sufficiently above the cost.  The second is that the required margin or multiple 
above the resource cost is higher than the value of the sunk cost and / or the 
uncertainty of the outcome. 
 
                                                                                                                                
4  Investment Under Uncertainty, Dixit & Pindyck, p.3  23 
PART IV: ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
Optimising Exposure to Risk  
For any organisation it should be remembered that the costs are not only direct, 
(such as contracting in skilled assistance), but also indirect and intangible, 
(such as damaging staff morale by diverting resources promised to one team to 
another team so that an opportunity can be realised elsewhere).  Managers 
have to set and justify priorities by some basis.  This is more easily done if the 
decision-making model is specific, logical and transparent. 
 
This is the final part of the framework.  It proposes a simple economic model of 
the trade-offs made between risk and opportunity to run an efficient and 





The marginal benefit of mitigation is described by a curve representing the 
decreasing exposure to risk as increasing resources are allocated to treat the 
risk.  Exposure to risk can be tangible with a specific monetary value (e.g. a 
ship sinking), intangible with an inestimable monetary value (e.g. loss of a 
government agency’s credibility with a Minister), or some combination of the 
two.  Likewise, mitigation costs can be tangible, intangible, with a specific or 
uncertain monetary value. 
 
The model proposes that the marginal cost of mitigation decreases as 
economies of scale occur, until such time a that each additional unit of 
treatment is more expensive than the last.  This occurs commonly with re-writes 
of policy advice in government agencies. 
 
In these circumstances, it can be argued that there are two logical points at 
which investment in mitigation treatment should be made.  The first, aa’ 
provides for the most efficient return on investment.  The second, at bb’, is at 
the point of diminishing returns, beyond which the additional resources 
allocated to treat the risk yield less return in reduction in exposure than value 
expended. 
 
“Good” management of operational risk can therefore be said to lie somewhere 
in the region of ab investment in mitigation. 
 
 
Optimising Exposure to Risk Optimising Exposure to Risk
Marginal benefit of
mitigation







a        b
aa1 : optimal efficiency




Simultaneously improving the marginal benefit of mitigation (e.g. improving 
workforce skills at constant labour rates) and shifting the marginal cost of 
mitigation (e.g. changing the conditions for insurance cover) combines to offer a 
range of choice in how to take the better return on investment.  This ranges 
from a reduction in exposure of b’c’ at the point of diminishing return (still 
allowing cb reduction in treatment cost); to a reduction in treatment cost of ad at 
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Optimising the Realisation of Opportunity 
Risk and opportunity lie at opposite ends of the operational spectrum.  While the 
same forces are present, the opportunity model can be shown to work in a 
different fashion. 
 
At the most basic level, it is necessary to effect some level of investment in the 
action (treatment) necessary to realise latent opportunities.  This can be 
tangible, (installing hot dog stands at a new football stadium), or intangible, 
(devising a new training policy to suit workers recruited into a new factory). 
 
Each additional unit of investment will initially yield an increasing amount of 
realised opportunity, but this will gradually diminish as it becomes more difficult 
to realise value latent in available opportunities.  At the same time, the marginal 
cost of realisation will initially fall through economies of scale, but start to rise 
past a critical point due to the inefficiencies of crowding out.  As with risk, the 
decision maker is faced with a choice as to which point to target investment – 
aa’ where marginal benefit and marginal cost are furthest apart, or bb’; beyond 
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a                 b
aa1 : optimal efficiency




Opportunity faces the operation decision-maker with different dynamics, 
however.  Taking steps to improve the marginal cost curve by shifting it to the 
right, and increasing the yield on each unit of investment at the margin, has the 
effect of incurring additional cost in realising additional marginal benefit at the 
point of diminishing returns.  In other words, shifting from bb’ to cc’ realises b’c’ 
more opportunity, but requires bc more investment.  Continuing to operate at 
the point of optimal efficiency, moving from aa’ to dd’ also incurs additional 
investment cost ad, albeit for the gain a’d’ in realised opportunity. 
 
Given the bias towards minimising investment costs in preference to making the 
most of opportunities, it becomes rational for decision-makers to leave 
investment cost structure alone, and to concentrate on realising more 
opportunity for each unit of investment.  This means remaining at a investment 
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The task of optimising exposure to risk and realising opportunity risk is 
complicated by further considerations; not least of which is that treatment 
factors tend to be lumpy.  As noted earlier, the tendency is to minimise 
investment costs.  Tangible factors have a known cost which is resisted overtly 
(e.g. funding for a computer programme), and intangible factors are resisted 
covertly (e.g. dissipating officially-dedicated senior management time to 
promote ethical standards). 
 
The operational environment has an infinite variety of possible dimensions and 
rates of change in which it can move.  Assigning probabilities to the future 
shape of the operating environment at any point in the future is at best educated 
guesswork.  This means that what is perceived to be appropriate treatment of 
potential opportunities and risks must, to some extent, be reactively triggered.  
This has implications for decision-makers dealing with operational risk:  
 
a)  Speed in adjusting treatment is important, not of itself, but to minimise the 
lag between the change in opportunity or risk and the most effective and 
efficient way of treating them. 
 
b)  Flexibility of treatment is vital.  The situation is analogous to pilots of 
modern ‘fly-by-wire’ jets having to rely on computer systems to cope with 
the volume and speed of data flow.  It means that the underlying systems 
must be reliable with built in ‘fail-safe’ systems to avoid disaster. 
 
c)  Anticipation of appropriate treatment actions is a cost-saving advantage. 
 
Explicit knowledge about risks and opportunities is a key feature of advanced 
operational risk management.  It recognises that: 
-  good data collection is essential for efficiency;  
-  systematic collation is required to allow sound judgement in the setting of 
priorities; and  
-  astute analysis must be available to provide insight and anticipation. 
 
Awareness of the factors underlying operational risk management practice will 
help those managing operational risks to take better decisions.  In particular, it 
will help them build up the institutional knowledge assets to: 
 
a)  Know and focus on key risks and opportunities. 
 
b)  Know and understand the effectiveness of the available treatment options. 
 
c)  Be efficient in applying the selected treatment options, including exercising 
the ‘waiting’ option. 
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CONCLUSION 
The framework presented looks at the features underlying operational risk 
management.  It provides different perspectives to see where the costs incurred 
by an organisation to manage its risks and opportunities are at their lowest, and 
where the potential to realise opportunities is greatest. 
 
Management of operational risk is best done through the systematic 
assessment and treatment of the trade-offs between risk and opportunity.  In 
doing so, the drivers of operational risk management need to be considered, as 
illustrated by some observed characteristics of operational risk management 
practice in the public and private sectors. 
 
It is clear that an organisation’s approach to operational risk management must 
be explicit if intangible risks and opportunities are to be well managed; and for 
knowledge assets in this area to be acquired and nurtured by the organisation.  
It is also apparent that investment decisions on the treatment of risk exposure, 
and particularly in the realisation of opportunities, need to be made with a clear 
understanding of the drivers that tend to skew decisions towards minimising 
cost and risk rather than maximising opportunity. 
 
Making the dynamics of operational risk management more transparent hinges 
on a) recognising the intangible factors involved and b) gauging the relative 
values of tangible and intangible factors.  This is not easy. 
 
Where it can be achieved, it allows more precise and better management of 
risks and opportunities.   It also helps investment decisions to be made 
consciously and in alignment with the appetite for risk in each of the important 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
The following interpretations have been made for the purpose of this paper. 
 
Risk appetite  The point of balance between risk and reward at which a decision-
maker feels most comfortable. 
Cost  Total price to be paid by an organisation (being the sum of direct 
and indirect, tangible and intangible charges).  
Event  An incident or situation that has occurred. 
Exposure 
(residual risk) 
Risks remaining after risk treatments have been applied. 
Impact  Realised potential of a risk or opportunity, i.e. the effect of an event 
or a potential event.  
Inherent Risk  Risks intrinsic to a given situation prior to the application of any 
alleviating or aggravating treatment. 
Likelihood  A value assigned to the probability or frequency with which a 




The systematic assessment and management of the trade-offs 
made between risk and opportunity to run an efficient and effective 
organisation. 
Opportunity  A potential event deemed to have a positive effect on an 
organisation.  (Evaluated by estimating the combined impact and 
likelihood.) 
Risk  A potential event deemed to have an adverse effect on an 








The systematic and conscious understanding, organisation and 
treatment of risks and opportunities. 
Sunk Cost  Costs which cannot be recovered when an organisation withdraws 
from providing a good or service 
Residual Risk 
(exposure) 
Risks remaining after risk treatments have been applied. 
Treatment  Conscious action in relation to a risk or opportunity: 
￿ Reject (walk away). 
￿ Transfer (split the risk with another party). 
￿ Accept (take the risks & opportunities as they come). 
￿ Optimise (reconfigure strategy, operations, culture, etc. to 
maximise opportunity and/or minimise risk). 
Uncertainty  Context in which an event occurs with some probability, the 
distribution of which is unknown 
 